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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030409-CA
v.
STEVE HOWARD THOMAS,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for multiple felonies, including aggravated
arson, a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the "pour-over"
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Should this Court reach defendant's claim that the trial court
improperly denied his motion to suppress where defendant's twosentence recitation of the relevant facts and his six-sentence argument
render his claim inadequately briefed?
No standard of review applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are determinative of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 27, 2003, defendant was charged by amended information with one
count of aggravated arson, a first-degree felony; three counts of arson, a second-degree
felony; one count of burglary, a second-degree felony; one count of arson, a third-degree
felony; and two counts of attempted arson, a third-degree felony. R. 223-224. After a
preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all charges. R. 42-43.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress all statements made by him to police
officers after he was placed in police custody. R. 108-10. He also moved to suppress
statements made to his mother during a telephone call from jail after he was arrested, and
a letter of apology he wrote to the fire victims at about the same time. R. 108-10, 114-20;
R. 350:8. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court admitted all statements except
defendant's pre-Miranda confession. R. 155-156.
A two-day trial followed, after which defendant was found guilty of all charges
except one of the attempted arson charges. R. 289-292, 326-28. Defendant was
sentenced to the statutory terms on each conviction, sentences to run concurrently R. 327.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 337. The supreme court transferred the matter to
this Court. R. 347.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The crimes. On August 3, 2002, the Beaver County Sheriffs Office responded to
reports of six fires in the Beaver area. R. 351:130, 135-37, 140-41; R. 352:237-38. One
of the fires involved a mobile home trailer owned by Kathy and Alan Green. R. 351:13236; R. 352:237-38. The rest were fires started in the haystacks of ranchers Clark
Bradshaw, Pete Yardley, Sam Kerksiek, Roland Yardley, and Orson Blackner. R.
351:130, 136-38, 140-41.2 The fires were reported at 8:46 p.m., 8:54 p.m., 9:13 p.m.,
9:20 p.m., 9:34 p.m., and 11:09 p.m., respectively. R. 351:163-64. On August 4, 2002,
officers learned of another fire in the haystack of John Smith. R. 351:132, 138.
Five witnesses saw a silver-colored older model Buick with a green auto dealer
sales tag and a temporary licence plate in the vicinity of several of the fires. R. 351:13031, 144,161-62, 179, 183-84, 190-91, 195-97, 203-04, 225-27. Two saw defendant
aggressively driving the car at about 6:15 p.m. on 1-15 and then saw the car exiting the
highway at the Beaver exit. R. 351:179, 182-84, 190-91. A third witness was driving by
the Green trailer at about 7:30 p.m. and saw the car there. R. 351:225-26. Shortly
thereafter, the witness saw the same car approach her from behind and then pass her,
going about 50 miles per hour. R. 351:226-27. A fourth witness, who lives near Clark
Bradshaw's property, saw the car speed by him as he was working on his farm, and then,

!

The facts of the crimes are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdicts. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, II 2, 12 P.3d 92.
2

Roland appears throughout the record as both "Roland" and "Rowland."
3

a few minutes later, speed by him going in the opposite direction. R. 351:195-96.
Almost immediately, the witness noticed a haystack on fire. R. 351:197. Finally, a fifth
witness saw the car near John Smith's property at about 9:00 p.m. R. 351:203. The
witness saw the driver exit the car, walk toward haystack, return to the car, return to the
haystack, and then get back into his car and leave. R. 351:204.
After investigation, Sergeant Cameron Noel, of the Beaver County Sheriffs
Office, identified defendant as the owner of a vehicle similar to the one witnesses had
described. R. 351:143, 223. Sergeant Noel then prepared a search warrant for
defendant's vehicle and home in Enoch on August 5. R. 351:143-44.
On August 5, 2002, Sergeant Noel, along with Agent Todd Hohbein, of the State
Fire Marshal's Office, Beaver County Deputy Sheriff Cody Black, and several other
officers served the warrant at defendant's home. R. 351:143-44; R. 352:278, 310.
Defendant was handcuffed and, a short while later, was read his Miranda rights. R.
351:145. Deputy Black then asked defendant, "What's going on?" R. 352:280.
Defendant "said he was just being a dumb ass." R. 352:280. "[H]e said that Roland had
owed him some money and that he figured that with the money that he owed him with
interest it was worth about a haystack." R. 352:280.
After the search, defendant was brought to the Iron County Sheriffs Office for a
taped interview with Sergeant Noel and Agent Hohbein. R. 351:146. Before the
interview, defendant was reminded of his Miranda rights. R. 351:146. Defendant
agreed to talk. R. 351:146.
4

During the interview, defendant admitted that he was responsible for the Blackner
and Yardley fires. R. 351:146; R. 352:322; St Exh. 15 at 2,4, 12, 18-19. Defendant
seemed almost "proud of lighting" Roland Yardley's haystack on fire. R. 351:151. He
said of Pete Yardley, "I just never liked that guy, I guess." St. Exh. 15 at 12.
After initially denying that he committed the Green fire, defendant admitted that he
had entered the trailer through a broken window, and, consistent with the evidence found
by Agent Hohbein, that he had started fires in both the middle and back bedrooms. R.
351:147-48; R. 352:283, 285-86, 290-92; St. Exh. 15 at 6-10. Defendant recalled that his
brother had lived in the trailer but had recently been told to leave. R. 352:292.
Defendant initially did not recall starting the fire at Clark Bradshaw's place. R.
351:149. However, after "some of the questioning and refreshing his memory, he
admitted to setting the fire." R. 351:150.
Concerning the Smith fire, defendant was asked whether his tire prints would be
found there. St. Exh. 15 at 10. Defendant replied, "Probably." R. 351:152; St Exh. 15 at
10. In fact, a tire print taken from the Smith property was consistent with the treads on
the rear passenger tire of defendant's Buick. R. 351:139, 158, 219, 221.
Defendant could not remember anything about the Kerksiek fire. R. 351:151.
After the interview, defendant was transported to the Beaver County Jail (R.
351:152). On the way, Sergeant Noel suggested that, if defendant was sorry for what he
had done, he should write a letter of apology (R. 3 51:156). When they arrived at the
county jail, Sergeant Noel provided defendant with a pencil and some paper to do so (R.
5

351:156). Defendant then wrote a letter "[t]o everyone that lost something]" explaining
"how truly sorry I am" (R. 351:157; St. Exh. 10).
Shortly thereafter, defendant made a telephone call to his mother (R. 351:152).
During the call, which was recorded, defendant's mother said, "Tell me this is not true"
(R. 351:155; St. Exh. 14-A at 1). When defendant said it was, his mother asked, "Are you
sure you did [it]?" (R. 351:155; St. Exh. 14-A at 2). Defendant responded, "Yes, because
it burned up my clothes" (R. 351:155; St. Exh. 14-A at 2).
Defendant fs motion to suppress. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to
suppress his statements to police officers on the day he was arrested, statements to his
mother during a telephone call later that day, and his letter of apology. R. 108-10, 11420; R. 350:8. Defendant asserted that statements made before he was Mirandized had to
be suppressed because they were made during a custodial interrogation. R. 118-19. He
asserted that statements made after he was Mirandized had to be suppressed because (a)
they were the fruit of a poisonous tree, (b) Sergeant Noel did not stop questioning him
after he had asked "whether he could have or needed an attorney," (c) Sergeant Noel had
encouraged defendant to take Xanax before the formal interview and defendant was "in a
drugged state" thereafter, and (d) his statements had been coerced by threats from
Sergeant Noel concerning his family. R. 116-19. Defendant asserted that his
conversation with his mother should be suppressed because it occurred while defendant
"was still suffering the effects of the excessive ingestion of [Xanax], and from the duress
inflicted through the threat [to his family], and from the unreasonably obtained
6

confession," and because it "was a private telephone conversation which was illegally
and/or unreasonably tapped." R. 116.
At the evidentiary hearing, defendant testified that he "had all my kids plus three
of my nieces" in his car and that they "were just going to McDonald's to pick up their
mom," when police arrived at his home on August 5 and placed him in handcuffs. R.
350:54. A short while later, Sergeant Noel and Agent Hohbein approached him and
began talking with him about the fires. R. 350:48, 66. During that conversation,
defendant admitted to committing two of the fires. R. 350:67. Defendant was then read
his Miranda rights. R. 350:48-49, 67. After his rights were read, defendant "never said
nothing at that time. But I was like, yeah, I'll talk to you guys." R. 350:67-68.
However, defendant claimed that he twice subsequently asked Sergeant Noel for
an attorney. R. 350:52-53, 57-58, 80-81. The first time was before defendant talked with
Deputy Black. R. 350:52-53, 57, 80. The second request came sometime later. R.
350:57-58, 81. Both times, according to defendant, Noel told him that he would have to
wait until the court appointed an attorney for him. R, 350:53, 57-58, 81. When asked to
clarify exactly what he had said to Noel each time, defendant testified that both times he
"asked [Noel] if I should get an attorney." R. 350:57-58.
Defendant also claimed that, throughout his encounter with Noel that day, Noel
repeatedly threatened to take his children away from him if he didn't cooperate. R.
350:49, 55-56, 58, 81. According to defendant, Noel made the first threat before
defendant talked with Deputy Black. R. 350:49, 55-56, 58.
7

Next, defendant claimed that, at one point while Sergeant Noel was searching his
home, defendant asked Noel if he could take some pills with him. R. 350:69. According
to defendant, Noel located defendant's pill bottle, which contained both Paxil and Xanax.
R. 350:70. Defendant first claimed that Noel then "handed" some pills to him which he
"just swallowed." R. 350:50. Defendant then claimed that Noel just "threw [five or six
Xanax] on the counter" and that defendant, who was still handcuffed, ate all of them off
of the counter. R. 350:50-51.
Defendant acknowledged that he was reminded of his Miranda rights before the
taped interview he gave at the Iron County Jail. R. 350:72. He also acknowledged that,
after being reminded of his rights, he did not request for an attorney but rather said he was
willing to talk. R. 350:72-73. According to defendant, "I kind of figured it didn't matter
because I [had already] asked twice for an attorney." R. 350:72. However, defendant
also acknowledged that he had "been through quite a few different criminal cases in [his]
life," and that he was "familiar with the process." R. 350:72.
Finally, defendant testified that, after the interview, Noel drove him from Iron
County to Beaver. R. 350:76. On the way, Noel talked with defendant about writing a
letter of apology. R. 350:76. When they arrived at the Beaver County Jail, Noel gave
defendant paper and a pencil to write the letter. R. 350:76. Defendant wrote the letter
almost immediately while by himself in a holding cell. R. 350:77. Either "right before or
right after that," defendant called his mother. R. 350:77. He did not recall reading the
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sign above the telephone warning that calls may be recorded. R. 350:77. According to
defendant, Noel "was standing right next to me" during the call. R. 350:79.
Defendant's wife testified that, after arriving home on August 5, she heard
defendant ask about an attorney twice just before he was put into Noel's vehicle. R.
350:83-84. The first time, defendant "asked if he should get him a lawyer or have me
contact a lawyer." R. 350:83. The second time, defendant asked, "My wife doesn't need
to get me a lawyer?" R. 350:84. Both times, according to defendant's wife, Noel told
defendant that "[t]he judge will let you know if you need a lawyer." R. 250:84.
Defendant's wife also claimed that, shortly after she arrived home, Sergeant Noel
told her that "if you say anything to [defendant] I will arrest you and I will put your kids
in a state home until we get this figured out." R. 350:85-86. Noel referenced defendant's
children directly to defendant in another conversation a short while later. R. 350:87.
Finally, defendant's wife recalled asking Sergeant Noel shortly before defendant
was taken away whether he could take his medication with him. R. 350:88. When Noel
said he could, defendant's wife retrieved defendant's medication from the house "and
brought it back out and gave it to Officer Noel." R. 350:88.
Sergeant Noel testified that when he arrived at defendant's home on August 5, he
and Agent Hohbein approached defendant, who was already in handcuffs, and "explained
to him that I had a warrant and that I had known him for many years" and that "I knew
that he would cooperate with us." R. 350:13, 15. Defendant "looked down at the
ground" and said, "'Yeah, I took out Blackner's and Roland's for sure, but I didn't set
9

any of the others.'" R. 350:15. Noel then gave defendant his Miranda warning. R.
350:16,36. Defendant said he was willing to talk. R. 350:19.
Noel testified that at no time during the search or subsequent interview did
defendant request an attorney. R. 350:16, 29. The only conversation on the issue
occurred while Noel was driving defendant to Beaver after his recorded interview. Noel
testified that, on the way, defendant asked what was going to happen next. R. 350:20.
Noel explained "what would happen as far as him seeing a judge, being arraigned, what
the charges would be .. . and how he would obtain an attorney." R. 350:20, 29
Moreover, at no time did Noel tell defendant that unless defendant confessed to the
crimes, his children would be placed in foster care. R. 350:32. Rather, Noel testified
that, when they arrived, they "wanted to find [defendant's] wife as soon as possible
because the children were there," that Noel ordered a deputy to pick defendant's wife up
from her job, and that, when she arrived, "[s]he took custody of the children." R. 350:31.
Noel then testified that, if defendant had told him about medication he needed to
take, Noel would have gotten the bottle for him and allowed him to take it with him but
would not have given him any pills. R. 350:33, 109. Noel did not recall defendant taking
any medication. R. 350:33.
Finally, Noel testified that he was not near defendant when defendant telephoned
his mother. R. 350:22. However, a sign just above the telephone clearly informed callers
that calls from the phone were subject to recording. R. 350:22.
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Agent Hohbein testified that he arrived at defendant's home to serve the search
warrant just after an Iron County deputy had arrived and placed defendant in handcuffs.
R. 350:101. Hohbein and Sergeant Noel then took defendant off to the side to talk. R.
350:95, 101. During the conversation that ensued, Hohbein asked defendant why he had
set the fires. R. 350:97. Defendant responded, "'I took out Blackner's and Roland's for
sure but did not set any of the others.'" R. 350:97. Defendant was asked to repeat the
statement and was then read his Miranda rights. R. 350:97.
Hohbein testified that he was with defendant for "the vast majority of time" they
were at defendant's home and that he "[absolutely" never heard defendant ask about an
attorney. R. 350:97, 103, 105. Moreover, at no time did defendant request an attorney
during the subsequent interview at the Iron County Jail. R. 350:104. Hohbein also
"absolutely" did not hear any statements from Noel telling defendant that he had to
cooperate or his children would be taken from him. R. 350:98. Finally, Hohbein recalled
defendant's wife bringing out a bottle of pills for defendant when he was being placed in
a police car for transport. R. 350:98. Hohbein did not see defendant ingest any pills. R.
350:98.
Deputy Black testified that, when he arrived at the search site, defendant was
talking with Sergeant Noel and Agent Hohbein near Sergeant Noel's truck. R. 350:43.
Noel approached Black and told him that defendant had confessed and was going to
cooperate. R. 350:44. Black asked if defendant was "under Miranda" and Noel said,
"yes." R. 350:44. Black then walked over to defendant and asked what was going on. R.
11

350:44. Defendant said something about being a "dumb ass," that Roland owed him
money, and that he figured "it was worth about a haystack." R. 350:44.
Black recalled a conversation about needing to contact defendant's wife so that she
could be there for the children, but did not recall the exact conversation. R. 350:46.
Black did not see any pills that night. R. 350:46. He never heard defendant ask about an
attorney. R. 350:46.
Trial court's ruling. In its written Memorandum Opinion, the trial court found,
based on Agent Hohbein's testimony, that defendant's initial statement to Sergeant Noel
and Agent Hohbein "was the product of police questioning prior to a Miranda warning."
R.215.
The court then made findings concerning whether defendant was "threatened with
the loss of his children if he did not talk to the officers" and whether Sergeant Noel
"allow[ed] the defendant to ingest 'several' pills which affected the defendant's mental
state during the later questioning at the Sheriffs Office." R. 214, 215. Concerning both
these issues, the trial court "[was] convinced that the defendant is misrepresenting the
facts." R. 214, 215. On the first issue, the court found that "[n]othing in the evidence
indicates any intent o[n] the part of the officers to remove the children from the care of
their mother." R. 215. On the second issue, the court found that "[t]he testimony of the
defendant is contradicted by the testimony of his wife and Sgt. Noel." R. 214.
The court next considered whether defendant was "given proper notice that his
statements to his mother . . . were likely to be overheard . . . and recorded." R. 214. The
12

court found that, where a sign over the phone informed defendant that his call might be
recorded, defendant "[k]new that he was risking being overheard and perhaps recorded."
R. 213. The court also found that defendant "was not under the supervision of Sgt. Noel"
while the telephone call was made. R. 213.
The court then made the following additional findings:
[T]he evidence clearly indicates that [after defendant was] advised of
his Miranda rights [,] . . . he made repeated voluntary statements to
law enforcement officers, to his mother, and to the victims
implicating himself in setting of the fires. The court has found no
evidence that he was under any pressure or deception when he made
those later statements . . . At the time he made the statements to
Deputy Black, to his mother, to officers at the jail, and to the victims,
he knew that he had the right to remain silent and to have the advice
of an attorney, but he chose to talk about the case voluntarily. His
motion to suppress seems motivated by regret about his decision in
view of the dire consequences that he is facing.
R. 213 (emphasis added).
The court concluded that defendant's prz-Miranda statements to Sergeant Noel
and Agent Hohbein "must be suppressed during the State's case in chief." R. 213.
However,
[sjince the initial statements, and all those that followed the Miranda
warning, were free of any coercive or deceptive activity by the
police, the later statements are admissible during the State's case in
chief. The first statement was the product of a technical violation of
Miranda at most, and should not result in the suppression of
statements given later after the defendant had been advised of his
rights and had been given time to consider the importance of the
warning.
R. 212 (emphasis added).

13

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
without making explicit findings on his claim that his post-Miranda statements had to be
suppressed because he had invoked his right to counsel. However, where neither
defendant's factual summary nor his legal analysis are sufficient to reach his claim, this
Court should reject defendant's claim as inadequately briefed.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO
SUPPRESS WHERE DEFENDANT'S TWO-SENTENCE
RECITATION OF THE RELEVANT FACTS AND HIS SIXSENTENCE ARGUMENT RENDER HIS CLAIM INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED
Defendant claims that the trial court "erred in denying in part" his motion to
suppress because the court "failed to address" and make findings on his claim that his
post-Miranda statements "were given after the Defendant invoked the right to counsel."
Aplt. Br. at 4. Defendant claims that "because of the conflict in testimony between the
Defendant and the officer, there is ambiguity which makes the assumption of a finding in
favor of the State unreasonable, and this Court should remand for a new trial." Aplt. Br.
at 4. This Court should reject defendant's claim as inadequately briefed.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's
brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the

14

issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v.
Gomez, 2002 UT 120, % 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Honie, 2002 UT
4, ^167, 57 P.3d 977 (rejecting inadequately briefed claim in death penalty case), cert
denied, 123 S.Ct 257; State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 46 n.5, 37 P.3d 1073. Thus,
"[i]mplicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to authority but development of
that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d
299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). In
short, this Court simply "will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth'
on behalf of defendants." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990).
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, this Court
will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 12, 69 P.3d 1278.
Similarly, "[wjhen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [this Court will] decline
to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, *{ 12, 52 P.3d 467. In fact,
"Utah courts routinely decline to considered inadequately briefed arguments." State v.
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ^ 28,
48 P.3d 872; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ^ 13, 72 P.3d 138.
Here, defendant's summary of the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing on his
suppression motion consists entirely of the following two sentences: "The Defendant did
testify at the hearing on the suppression motion that he did in fact invoke his right to
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counsel. The officer to whom the invocation request was allegedly made, Sergeant
Cameron Noel, denied that the invocation was made." Aplt. Br. at 3 (citation to record
omitted).
This summary is inadequate under rule 24(a)(9). First, defendant's summary does
not accurately reflect his testimony at the motion hearing, where defendant in fact
clarified that he never actually asked Sergeant Noel for an attorney, but, rather, only
asked whether he should get one. R. 350:57-58. Moreover, defendant's summary
completely ignores all the testimony given by defendant that the trial court expressly
found not credible. R. 213-15; R. 350:49, 50-51, 55-56, 58, 69-70, 79, 81. Finally,
defendant's summary does not include any reference to the two other officers whose
testimony, in addition to Noel's, contradicted defendant's concerning whether defendant
ever asked about an attorney. R. 350:46, 97-98, 103-05. Because all of these facts are
relevant to defendant's claim on appeal, defendant's two-sentence factual summary is
inadequate under rule 24(a)(9). See, e.g., Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20 (holding that
appellate court "is entitled to have the issues clearly defined").
Moreover, defendant's argument consists of exactly six sentences with citation to
one case, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (addressing when this Court
will assume that the trial court made the necessary findings to support its rulings), after
which defendant summarily concludes that, "because of the conflict in testimony between
the Defendant and the officer, there is ambiguity which makes the assumption of a
finding in favor of the State unreasonable." Aplt. Br. at 4.
16

Nowhere does defendant set forth the law governing a defendant's right to counsel,
let alone explain why his alleged query as to whether he should retain an attorney was
sufficient to invoke that right. See Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^f 12 (holding that when
appellant fails to present any relevant authority, this Court will "decline to find it for
him5'); Webb, 790 P.2d at 72 n.2 (holding this Court simply "will not engage in
constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth' on behalf of defendants"); see also State v.
Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 742-43 (Utah 1997) (recognizing that under Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), once suspect waives his Miranda rights, law enforcement
officers have no duty to stop questioning suspect unless he "'unambiguously'" reinvokes
his rights); see also Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1056 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that, where defendant had prior experience with criminal system, defendant's statement
"asking police whether he needed an attorney is n o t . . . a sufficiently clear request for
counsel to require the cessation of questioning under Davis"); State v. Ninci, 936 P.2d
1364, 1381 (Kan. 1997) (holding that, where defendant "simply asked the officer whether
the officer thought [he] should get an attorney," defendant's question was insufficient to
reinvoke his right to counsel); State v. Jones, 914 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Mo. App. 1996)
(holding that defendant "did not unequivocally state that he wanted an attorney" when he
asked, "'Do I need an attorney?'"); State v. Taylor, 759 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ohio App.)
("[E]ven assuming that Taylor's allegation [that he referenced an attorney] is true, the
statement 'Do I need an attorney?' is equivocal and ambiguous" and, thus, "the law does
not require that the police cease questioning"), cert, denied, 755 N.E.2d 352 (Ohio 2001).
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In addition, nowhere does defendant explain why a finding that defendant did not
invoke his right to counsel is not implicit in the trial court's ruling where the court both
found defendant not credible on the issues it specifically addressed and found that, at the
time defendant made his post-Miranda statements, "he knew that he had the right... to
have the advice of an attorney, but he chose to talk about the case voluntarily." R. 213
(emphasis added). See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (holding rule 24(a)(9) "requires not just
bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based
on that authority"); Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 12 ("When a party fails to offer any
meaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to reach the merits."). Cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
at 787 (holding that, "in cases in which factual issues are presented to and must be
resolved by the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, we 'assume that the
trier of facts found them in accord with its decision'").
Because defendant has provided this Court with neither the factual background nor
the legal analysis necessary to address his claim, this Court should reject defendant's
claim as inadequately briefed.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED /

November 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
KAREN A. KLUCZMK
Assistant Attorney General
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